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Abstract
This paper derives restrictions on monetary and fiscal policies for determinate
equilibria in a two-country monetary union with autarkic members. It finds that
a central bank following the Taylor principle may not be sufficient for determinacy
unless accompanied by one ’active’ fiscal authority in the sense of Leeper (1991).
Alternatively, both fiscal authorities can be ’active’ while the central bank abandons
the Taylor principle. The two determinate equilibria have significantly different im-
plications for the transmission of fiscal and monetary shocks and for the fiscal theory
of the price level in a monetary union.
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1 Introduction
There has been a considerable amount of research on the fiscal theory of the price level
(FTPL) in the context of monetary unions.1 However, these analyses seem to be of
limited relevance since they rest upon the assumption of a common price level. This as-
sumption is generally rationalised by intensified trade within a currency union such that
prices and hence inflation rates are perfectly aligned. Yet, this appears to be a particu-
larly special case. Often enough, one does not observe the aforementioned alignment of
inflation rates but instead persistent and significant differences, for example due to non-
tradable goods. Via the abstraction from trade and thus introduction of country-specific
price levels, this paper sheds light on the other extreme end of the spectrum. The results
are threefold. First, the analysis shows that the central bank can be impotent in terms
of stabilising inflation rates across both union countries. Second, it reveals which fiscal
policy combinations support determinacy and how spillover effects from national fiscal
shocks occur within the union. Lastly, it shows under which conditions fiscal inflation
is unavoidable in a monetary union. The case of autarkic members of a monetary union
can be seen as an extreme benchmark for the fiscal theory of the price level.
Section 2 presents a simple model of a monetary union with one central bank and two
fiscal authorities while section 3 discusses parameter regions which yield determinate,
indeterminate or unstable equilibria. Properties of the determinate equilibria are derived
in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
The model is a simple cashless extension of Leeper’s (1991) single closed endowment
economy to a monetary union consisting of two autarkic countries, H(ome) of size n
and F(oreign) of size 1− n with n ∈ (0, 1).2 While monetary policy is common to both
countries in the union, fiscal policies are country-specific. The absence of trade delivers
a simple justification for country-specific price levels while preserving the possibility of
identical inflation expectations across both countries.
Each country i = H,F consists of a single household maximising expected lifetime utility
derived from consumption Ct as in
maxE0
∞∑
t=0
βt log(Cit) (1)
subject to
Cit +
Bit
P it
+ τ it = Y
i +Rt−1
Bit−1
P it
(2)
where Rt denotes the risk-free nominal interest rate set by the central bank, P
i
t the
domestic price level and Bit bond holdings of the household of its domestic government.
1See for instance Woodford (1996), Sims (1997), Bergin (2000) and Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000).
2The results of the single economy in Leeper (1991) are nested in this analysis for n ∈ [0; 1]
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Each period each country is endowed with Y H = Y F = Y units of the consumption good
of which a constant fraction GH = GF = G is consumed by the respective government.3
The households’ optimality conditions after imposing market clearing are
1
Rt
= βEt
[
1
piHt+1
]
and
1
Rt
= βEt
[
1
piFt+1
]
(3)
where piit+1 = P
i
t+1/P
i
t denotes gross inflation. Evidently, inflation expectations are
identical across countries. Importantly however, actual domestic inflation rates might
differ due to country-specific disturbances.
Governments control domestic lump-sum taxes τ it and issue debt to finance their expenses
G in each period. The budget constraint for i’s government reads
Bit
P it
+ τ it = G+Rt−1
Bit−1
P it
. (4)
Following Leeper (1991), fiscal authorities adjust their lump-sum taxes in response to
last periods level of real debt bit = B
i
t/P
i
t according to
τ it = γ
i
0 + γ
ibit−1 + ψ
i
t . (5)
Union-wide inflation is defined as the weighted average of national inflation rates ac-
cording to the respective country size such that
piUt = npi
H
t + (1− n)piFt . (6)
At the union level, the monetary authority sets Rt in response to union-wide inflation
piUt as in
Rt = φ0 + φpi
U
t + θt (7)
The country-specific fiscal shocks ψit and the common monetary policy shock θt are
assumed to follow AR(1) processes of the form
ψit = ρ
iψit−1 + e
i
t, where |ρi| < 1, eit ∼ N (0, σ2i ) , (8)
θt = ρθt−1 + et, where |ρ| < 1, et ∼ N (0, σ2) . (9)
These innovations represent unsystematic policy behaviour stemming from e.g. policy
implementation errors or unmodeled economic disturbances. eHt , e
F
t and et are taken to
be serially and mutually uncorrelated.
3A positive correlation between the endowment and country size does not alter the results.
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3 Model solution and indeterminacy
The model’s equations can be reduced to a recursive system in domestic inflation rates
and real debt. Combining (3) with (7) and linearising yields
Et
[
pˆiHt+1
]
= φβ[npˆiHt + (1− n)pˆiFt ] + βθt (10)
Et
[
pˆiFt+1
]
= φβ[npiHt + (1− n)piFt ] + βθt . (11)
where hats denote deviations from the deterministic steady state.4 Substitution of policy
rules into the government budget constraints delivers laws of motion for real debt in H
and F
bˆHt = (1/β − γH)bˆHt−1 −
b
piβ
pˆiHt +
bφ
Rβ
pˆiUt−1 − ψHt +
b
Rβ
θt−1 (12)
bˆFt = (1/β − γF )bˆFt−1 −
b
piβ
pˆiFt +
bφ
Rβ
pˆiUt−1 − ψFt +
b
Rβ
θt−1 . (13)
Since pˆiUt can be substituted for, the system consists of two state (bˆ
H
t , bˆ
F
t ) and two jump-
ing (pˆiHt , pˆi
F
t ) variables. According to Blanchard and Kahn (1980), the system requires
two stable and two unstable roots in order to be determinate.
As in Leeper (1991) a policy is active (passive) if the respective authority is un-
constrained (constrained) by budgetary conditions such that the associated eigenvalue
with this policy is greater (smaller) than one in absolute values. The two eigenval-
ues associated with fiscal policy parameters are 1β − γH and 1β − γF and identical to
Leeper’s one-country case. The eigenvalue associated with monetary policy is φβ while
the last eigenvalue of the system is zero. The zero-eigenvalue is a finding independent of
the size parameter n and implies that monetary policy can only fix one jumping variable.
Figure 1 illustrates parameter regions of eigenvalues associated with fiscal policies de-
pendent on the monetary policy regime being active or passive. Region I is characterised
by having three to four stable roots such that equilibria in this region are indeterminate.
In figure 1a in region II, the combination of active monetary policy and one active fiscal
authority which refuses to adjust taxes strongly to domestic debt yields exactly enough
stable roots for determinacy. Similarly in region III in figure 1b, two active fiscal policies
in conjunction with passive monetary policy provide the system with two unstable and
two stable roots. In region IV in figure 1b however, three active authorities generate
three unstable roots preventing the existence of an equilibrium.
The striking result is that an active monetary policy following the Taylor principle
via φ fails to determine uniquely an equilibrium unless accompanied by one active fiscal
policy as displayed by region I in figure 1a. Mathematically, equations (6), (10) and (11)
form a subsystem in three variables which does not deliver a unique solution as has been
4Due to almost linearity of the model, linearisation is a reasonably accurate approximation.
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Figure 1: Parameter regions
already indicated by the zero-eigenvalue of the full system. Active monetary policy alone
is not able to resolve the inherent indeterminacy. The economic intuition for this result
is straightforward. The central bank has one policy instrument at hand with which she
can uniquely determine union-wide inflation. But due to the isolation of each country
within the union, country-specific inflation rates are not uniquely tied together. So even
if the weighted average pˆiUt is determined by monetary policy, its components, pˆi
H
t and
pˆiFt , may drift apart. Thus, active monetary policy on the union level combined with
two passive fiscal policies necessarily renders the equilibrium indeterminate.
4 Equilibrium properties
The following section derives properties of the two determinate equilibria to illustrate
differences in shock transmission mechanisms and the possibility of fiscal inflation across
equilibria.
4.1 Region II equilibrium
When monetary policy is active (|φβ| > 1) one can solve for pˆiUt after combining (10)
and (11) to
pˆiUt =
β
ρ− φβ θt . (14)
Union-wide inflation is entirely determined by monetary policy shocks θt while country-
specific fiscal shocks have no impact.
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When fiscal policy in H is active (|1/β − γH | > 1), its respective budget constraint has
the forward solution
bˆHt =
ρH
1/β − γH − ρH ψ
H
t (15)
where debt solely depends on domestic fiscal shocks. Substitution back into the budget
constraint yields country H’s inflation rate
pˆiHt = −
piβ
bH
(
1/β − γH
1/β − γH − ρH
)
ψHt +
piβ
bH
(1/β − γH)bˆHt−1 + φβpˆiUt−1 + βθt−1 . (16)
The inflation rate under an active fiscal regime depends on domestic fiscal shocks as well
as past monetary policy shocks. Under active fiscal policy, domestic fiscal shocks cause
a wealth effect for domestic residents explaining the dependence of pˆiHt on ψ
H
t revealing
the scope for fiscal inflation. In the absence of domestic fiscal shocks, pˆiHt is pegged to
expected union-wide inflation since the last two expressions in equation (16) represent
Et−1[pˆiUt ].
Finally, via (6) the inflation rate in F can be determined to be
pˆiFt =
1
1− n
β
ρ− φβ θt
+
n
1− n
[(
−piβ
bH
)(
1/β − γH
1/β − γH − ρH
)
ψHt +
piβ
bH
(1/β − γH)bˆHt−1 + φβpˆiUt−1 + βθt−1
]
.
(17)
Inflation in F responds to fiscal shocks of H but not to own fiscal shocks. These fiscal
shock spillovers are of such magnitude that pˆiUt remains at its steady state due to the
active monetary policy. Fiscal shocks in F do not affect pˆiFt since its fiscal stance ensures
domestic debt stability, i.e. they do not cause a wealth effect. Hence, fiscal inflation is
not present in F .
Lastly, the debt stock in F evolves according to the backward solution of its govern-
ment budget constraint
bˆFt =
∞∑
k=0
(1/β − γF )k
(−bF
piβ
pˆiFt−k +
bF
Rβ
(
ρ
ρ− φβ
)
θt−1−k − ψFt−k
)
. (18)
4.2 Region III equilibrium
Under passive monetary policy both its associated eigenvalues are smaller than one.
Consequently, determinacy requires both fiscal policies to be active such that both gov-
ernment budget constraints have a forward solution
bˆHt =
ρH
1/β − γH − ρH ψ
H
t (19)
bˆFt =
ρF
1/β − γF − ρF ψ
F
t . (20)
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Equilibrium real debt depends on the respective fiscal shock of the country but is un-
affected by monetary policy shocks. As before, one can substitute bˆit back into the
respective government budget constraint to determine individual inflation rates
pˆiHt = −
piβ
bH
(
1/β − γH
1/β − γH − ρH
)
ψHt +
piβ
bH
(1/β − γH)bˆHt−1 + φβpˆiUt−1 + βθt−1 (21)
pˆiFt = −
piβ
bF
(
1/β − γF
1/β − γF − ρF
)
ψFt +
piβ
bF
(1/β − γF )bˆFt−1 + φβpˆiUt−1 + βθt−1 .(22)
Inflation in i depends on its domestic fiscal shock meaning that both countries exhibit
scope for fiscal inflation. Contrary to region II, there are no direct spillovers of domestic
fiscal shocks to the other country in the union. As before, by behaving actively a fiscal
authority pegs its national inflation rate to the expected union-wide inflation.
Finally, by combining (21) and (22) one obtains the expression for union-wide inflation
pˆiUt = n
[
−piβ
bH
(
1/β − γH
1/β − γH − ρH
)
ψHt +
piβ
bH
(1/β − γH)bˆHt−1
]
+ (1− n)
[
−piβ
bF
(
1/β − γF
1/β − γF − ρF
)
ψFt +
piβ
bF
(1/β − γF )bˆFt−1
]
+ φβpˆiUt−1 + βθt−1 .
(23)
which is no longer shielded from country-specific fiscal disturbances. Similar to a one-
country case, a passive monetary authority loses the ability to determine its associated
inflation rate on its own.
5 Conclusion
This paper finds that a central bank may fail to stabilise inflation across autarkic mem-
ber countries of a monetary union. This result calls into question the universal validity
of the Taylor principle. Additionally, the findings have implications for the FTPL in a
monetary union as they show how an active or irresponsibly acting fiscal policy might
be necessary for determinacy and how it leaves room for fiscal inflation.
Because it addresses the extreme case of autarky across union member countries, the
results serve as a benchmark and motivate a deeper analysis of multiple equilibria and
fiscal inflation in multi-country settings with trade in goods and financial assets. Future
research should focus on the inclusion of these features and analyse how different policy
coordination schemes in a monetary union alter equilibrium characteristics.
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